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ABSTRACT
In this paper we investigate a new computing paradigm, called
SocialCloud, in which computing nodes are governed by so-
cial ties driven from a bootstrapping trust-possessing social
graph. We investigate how this paradigm differs from exist-
ing computing paradigms, such as grid computing and the
conventional cloud computing paradigms. We show that in-
centives to adopt this paradigm are intuitive and natural, and
security and trust guarantees provided by it are solid. We
propose metrics for measuring the utility and advantage of
this computing paradigm, and using real-world social graphs
and structures of social traces; we investigate the potential
of this paradigm for ordinary users. We study several design
options and trade-offs, such as scheduling algorithms, cen-
tralization, and straggler handling, and show how they affect
the utility of the paradigm. Interestingly, we conclude that
whereas graphs known in the literature for high trust prop-
erties do not serve distributed trusted computing algorithms,
such as Sybil defenses—for their weak algorithmic proper-
ties, such graphs are good candidates for our paradigm for
their self-load-balancing features.
Keywords
Distributed computing, Security, Trust, Social Computing,
Performance.
1. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing is a new paradigm of computing
that overcomes the restriction of conventional comput-
ing paradigms by enabling new technological and eco-
nomical aspects, such as elasticity and pay-as-you-go—
which free users from long-term commitments and obli-
gation towards service providers. Cloud computing is
beneficial for both consumers and cloud service providers.
While it meets customers and users technological de-
mands, the cloud computing paradigm is also a rich
field of profit to cloud providers [3].
For users, cloud computing overcomes several short-
comings as opposed to using conventional computing
paradigms; where the used infrastructure and software
are owned by the user. For example, cloud computing
enables users of the cloud—who also can be providers
of services—to virtually locate their contents closers to
their consumers and reduce latency of serving such con-
tents, a challenging issue in conventional computing set-
tings. Also, considering the return on investment, cloud
computing has its appealing economical benefits and
incentives, which make it a desirable option to many
users. These incentives can be seen in the long run
as a reduced overall cost resulting from hardware and
software liabilities and maintenance costs in alternative
paradigms [3]. As for providers, benefits are also eco-
nomical in the absolute sense.
The current conventional cloud computing paradigm
has many benefits, despite posing several challenging
issues that need to be addressed before wider adoption
by many potential users [22]. Examples of these issues
include the need for concrete and clear business model
that outlines clearer service level agreements (SLA) and
guarantees the rights of users [29, 28, 15], the need for
architectures that consider the variety of potential ap-
plications demanded by users, the need for program-
ming models that consider the large scale of data in
the cloud, and the need for new applications that ben-
efit from the architectural and programming models in
the cloud, among other issues. While many of these is-
sues are being constantly addressed in ongoing research
efforts; where several architectures [19, 9, 51], program-
ming models [21, 16, 47], and applications [43, 54, 27,
51, 10, 29, 28] are proposed, security and data privacy
are chief among other issues to be considered before
this paradigm is widely accepted. Indeed, both out-
sider and insider threats to security and privacy of data
in cloud systems are unlimited. Also, incentives do exist
for cloud providers to make use of users’ data residing in
cloud for their own benefits, for the lack of regulations
and enforcing policies.
In this paper, we oversee a new type of computing
paradigm, called SocialCloud, that enjoys parts of
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the merits provided by the conventional cloud. Imag-
ine the scenario of a computing paradigm where users
who collectively construct a pool of resources perform
computational tasks on behalf of their social acquain-
tance. Our paradigm and model are similar in many
aspects to the conventional grid-computing paradigm.
It exhibits such similarities in that users can outsource
their computational tasks to peers, complementarily to
using friends for storage, which is extensively studied
in literature. Our paradigm is, however, very unique in
many aspects as well. Most importantly, our paradigm
exploits the trust exhibited in social networks as a guar-
antee for the good behavior of other “workers in the
system”. Accordingly, the most important ingredient
to our paradigm is the social bootstrapping graph, a
graph that is used for recruiting workers for a social
network.
Indeed, social networks are very popular (c.f. §3.1).
This popularity of social networks has opened the door
wide for investigating the potential of these networks
for many applications. Problems that are unsolvable in
the cyberspace are easily solvable using social networks,
for that they possess both algorithmic properties—such
as connectivity—and trust, which are used to reason
about the behavior of honest users in the social network,
and limit the misbehavior introduced by other malicious
users supported by efficiency features. Most important
to the context of our paradigm is the aggregate com-
putational power of nodes in the social network. In-
deed, beyond the nodes and social links, the social net-
works consist of users with computing machines that
are idle for most of the time [6]. Furthermore, owners
of these computing machines are willing to share their
computing resources for their friends, and for a different
economical model than in the conventional cloud com-
puting paradigm—fully altruistic one. This behavior
makes our work share commonalities with an existing
stream of work on creating computing services through
volunteers [53, 14]. Our results hence highlight tech-
nical aspects of this direction and pose challenges for
designs options when using social networks for recruit-
ing such workers and enabling trust.
1.1 Contributions
To this end, our contribution in this paper is mainly
twofold:
• First, we investigate the potential of the social
cloud computing paradigm by introducing a design
that bootstraps from social graphs to construct
distributing computing services. We advocate the
merits of this paradigm over existing ones such as
the grid computing paradigm.
• Second, we verify the potential of our paradigm us-
ing simulation set-up and real-world social graphs
with varying social characteristics that reflect dif-
ferent, and possibly contradicting, trust models.
Both graphs and the simulator are made public [40]
to the community to make use of them, and im-
prove by additional features.
1.2 Organization
The organization of this paper is as follows. In §2
we argue for the case of our paradigm. In §3 we review
the preliminaries of this work. In §4, we introduce the
main design, including an intensive discussion on the
design options. In §5, we describe our simulator used
for verifying the performance aspects of our design. In
§6 we introduce the main results and detailed analy-
ses and discussion of the design options, their benefits,
and limitations. In §7, we summarize some of the re-
lated work, including work on using social networks for
building trustworthy computing services. In §8, we we
draw concluding remarks followed by future work and
directions in §9.
2. THE CASE FOR SocialCloud
In this paper, we look at the potential of using un-
structured social graphs for building distributed com-
puting systems. These systems are proposed with sev-
eral anticipated benefits in mind. First, such systems
would exploit locality of data based on the applications
they are intended for, under the assumption that the
data would be stored at multiple locations and shared
among users represented in the social network—see §3.4
and [53] for concrete examples of such applications. This
is in fact not a far-fetched assumption. For example,
consider a co-authorship social graph, like the one used
in our experiments, where the SocialCloud is pro-
posed for deployment. In that scenario, data on which
computations are to be performed is likely to be at mul-
tiple locations; on machines of research collaborators,
co-authors, or previous co-authors. Even for some on-
line social networks, the assumption and achieved ben-
efits are not far-fetched as well, considering that friends
would have similar interests, and likely to have contents
replicated across different machines, which could be po-
tentially of interest to use in our computing paradigm.
Examples of such settings include photos taken at par-
ties, videos—for image processing applications, among
others.
The second advantage of this paradigm is its trust-
worthiness. In the recent literature, there has been a lot
of interest in the distributed computing community for
exploiting social networks to perform trustworthy com-
putations. Examples of these literature works include
exploiting social networks for cryptographic signing ser-
vices [55], Sybil defenses [58, 18, 57], and routing in
many settings including the delay tolerant networks [7,
17]. In all of these cases, along with the algorithmic
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property in these social networks, the built designs ex-
ploit the trust in social networks. The trust in these
networks rationalizes the assumption of collaboration
in these built system, and the tendency of nodes in the
network to act according to the intended protocol with
the theorized guarantees. Same as in all of these appli-
cations, SocialCloud tries to exploit the trust aspect
of the social network, and thus it is easy to reason about
the behavior of nodes in this paradigm (c.f. §3.3).
Related to trust exhibited in the social fabric uti-
lized in our paradigm, the third advantage is that it
is also easy to reason about the recruitment of work-
ers. In this context, workers are nodes that are will-
ing to perform computing tasks for other nodes (tasks
outsourcers). This feature, when associated with the
aforementioned trust, is quite advantageous when com-
pared to the challenge of performing trustworthy com-
puting on dedicated workers in the conventional grid-
computing paradigm, where it is hard to recruit such
workers.
Finally, our design oversees an altruistic model of So-
cialCloud, where nodes participate in the system and
do not expect in return. Further details on this model
are in §3.3.
Grid Computing. While the SocialCloud uses a
similar paradigm to that of the grid computing paradigm—
in the sense that both try to outsource computations
and use high aggregate computational resources, the
SocialCloud is slightly different. In particular, in the
SocialCloud, there is a pre-defined relationship be-
tween the task outsourcer and the computing worker,
which does not exist in the grid-computing paradigm.
We limit the computations to 1−hop neighbors, which
further improve trustworthiness of computations in our
model.
3. ASSUMPTIONS AND SETTINGS
In this section, we review the preliminaries required
for understanding the rest of this paper. In particu-
lar, we elaborate on the social networks, their popular-
ity, and their potential for being used as bootstrapping
tools for systems, services, and protocols. We describe
the social network formulation at a high level, the eco-
nomical aspect of our system, and finally, the attacker
model.
3.1 Systems on Social Networks
Social networks are so popular. Nine of the twenty
most popular sites on the web are for social network-
ing [24]. The top ten online social networking web-
sites have more than 650 million of unique visitors per
month in total. The most popular social network, Face-
book [25] alone serves 250 million unique visitors per
month, with more than 96 unique visitors per second.
Such popularity of social networks has motivated so
many designs, protocols, and applications on top of so-
cial networks. Examples include routing [7, 17, 20, 37],
social gossip [1, 26, 12], and Sybil defenses [58] (c.f. §7).
While they are different in the details of their opera-
tion, all of these designs and protocols weigh algorith-
mic properties (connectivity), trust, and collaboration
in the underlying social networks, which are used for
bootstrapping such systems.
3.2 Social Graphs—High Level Description
In this paper we view the social network as an undi-
rected and unweighted graph G = (V,E), where V =
{v1, . . . , vn} is the set of vertexes, representing the set
of nodes in the social graph, and correspond to users (or
computing machines), and E = {eij} (where 1 ≤ i ≤ n
and 1 ≤ j ≤ n) is the set of edges connecting those
vertices—which implies that nodes associated with the
social ties are willing to perform computations for each
other. |V | = n denotes the size of G and |E| = m
denotes the number of edges in G. In the rest of the
paper, social network, network, and graph are used in-
terchangeably to refer to both the physical computing
network and the underlying bootstrapping social graph,
and the meaning depends on the context. Also, we refer
to computing entities associated with users in the social
network as nodes.
3.3 Economics of SocialCloud
In our design we assume an altruistic model, which
simplifies the behavior of users and arguments on the
attacker model. In this altruistic model, users in the
social network donate their computing resources—while
not using them—to other users in the social network to
use them for specific computational tasks. In return,
the same users who donated their resources for others
would anticipate others as well to perform their compu-
tations on behalf of them when needed.
One can further improve this model. Social networks
are rich of trust characteristics that capture additional
features, and can be used to rationalize this model in
several ways. For example, trust in social networks, a
well studied vein of research in this context [38], can
be used to adjust this model so as users would bind
their participation in computations to trust values that
they assign to other users. In this work, in order to
make use of and confirm this model, we limit outsourced
computations at 1-hop.
While we do not consider that in this paper, another
model using interests and groups is worth mentioning
for its popularity and potential as a future work. The
incentives model can be further relaxed by enabling “in-
terest” based model of computation where workers do
computation to other nodes in the graph that only share
some interest with them. This interest can be publicly
identified by the membership of a node in a group. In-
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vestigating this model is left as a future work.
3.4 Use Model and Applications
For our paradigm, we envision compute intensive ap-
plications, for which other systems have been developed
in the past using different design principles, but lacking
trust features; where trust is needed in such applications
and provided by our paradigm. These systems include
ones with resources provided by volunteers, as well as
grid-like systems, like in Condor [36], MOON [34], Neb-
ula [14, 53], and SETI@Home [2].
Specific examples of applications built on top of these
systems, that would as well fit to our use model, include
blog analysis [53], web crawling and social-network ap-
plications (collaborative filtering, image processing, etc) [11],
scientific computing [52], among others.
Notice that each of these applications requires cer-
tain levels of trust for which social ties are best suited
as a trust bootstrapping and enabling tool. Especially,
reasoning about the behavior of systems and expected
outcomes (in a computing system in particular) would
be well-served by this trust model. We notice that this
social trust has been previously used as an enabler for
privacy in file-sharing systems [30], anonymity in com-
munications systems [42], and collaboration in sybil de-
fenses [33, 57, 38], among others. In this work, we use
the same insight to propose a computing paradigm that
relies on such trust and volunteered resources, in the
form of shared computing time. With that in mind, in
the following section we elaborate on the attacker used
in our system and trust models provided by our design,
thus highlight its advantage and distancing our work
from prior works in the literature.
3.5 Attacker Model
In this paper, as it is the case in many other systems
built on top of social networks [57, 58, 49], we assume
that the attacker is restricted in many aspects. For ex-
ample, the attacker has a limited capability of creating
arbitrarily many edges between himself and other nodes
in the social graph.
While this restriction may contradict some recent re-
sults in the literature [8]—where it is shown that some
legitimate users befriend random users in the social net-
work who are potentially attackers, it can be relaxed to
achieved the intended trust and attack model by consid-
ering an overlay of subset of friends of each users. This
overlay expresses the trust value of the social graph well
and eliminates the influence introduced by the attacker
who infiltrated the social graph [38]. For example, since
each user decides on to which node among his adjacent
nodes to outsource computations to, each user is aware
of other users he knows well and those who are just
social encounters that could be potential attackers. Ac-
cordingly, the user himself decides whether to include
a given node in his overlay or not, thus minimizing or
eliminating harm and achieving the required trust and
attack model.
The description of the above attacker model might
be at odds with the rest of the paper, especially that
we use some online social networks that do not reflect
characteristics of trust required in our paradigm. How-
ever, such networks, when used, are used for two rea-
sons. First, to derive insight on the potential of such
social networks, and others that share similar topologi-
cal characteristics, for performing computational tasks
according to the method devised in this paper. Second,
we use them to illustrate that some of these social net-
works might be less effective than the trust-possessing
social graphs, which we strongly advocate for our com-
puting paradigm.
3.6 Trust in Grid Computing Systems
While there has been a lot of research on charac-
terizing and improving trust in the conventional grid
computing paradigm [4, 5, 46, 31]—which is the closest
paradigm to compare to ours, trust guarantees in such
paradigm are less strict than what is expressed by so-
cial trust. For that, it is easy to see that some nodes in
the grid computing paradigm may act maliciously by,
for example, giving wrong computations, or refusing to
collaborate; which is even easier to detect and tolerate,
as opposed to acting maliciously [13].
4. THE DESIGN OF SOCIALCLOUD
The main design of SocialCloud is very simple,
where complexities are hidden in design choices and
options. In SocialCloud, the computing overlay is
bootstrapped by the underlying social structure. Ac-
cordingly, nodes in the social graph act as workers to
their adjacent nodes (i.e., nodes which are one hop away
from the outsourcer of computations). An illustration
of this design is depicted in Figure 1. In this design,
nodes in the social graph, and those in the Social-
Cloud overlay, use their neighbors to outsource com-
putational tasks to them. For that purpose, they utilize
local information to decide on the way they schedule the
amount of computations they want each and every one
of their neighbors to take care of. Accordingly, each
node has a scheduler which she uses for deciding the
proportion of tasks that a node wants to outsource to
any given worker among her neighbors. Once a task is
outsourced to the given worker, and assuming that both
data and code for processing the task are transferred to
the worker, the worker is left to decide how to schedule
the task locally to compute it. Upon completion of a
task, the worker sends back the computations result to
the outsourcer.
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4.1 Design Options: Scheduling Entity
In the SocialCloud, two schedulers are used. The
first scheduler is used for determining the proportion of
task outsourced to each worker and the second sched-
uler is used at each worker to determine how tasks out-
sourced by outsourcers are computed and in which or-
der. While the latter scheduler can be easily imple-
mented locally without impacting the system complex-
ity, the decision used for whether to centralize or de-
centralize the former scheduler impacts the complexity
and operation of the entire system. In the following, we
elaborate on both design decisions, their characteristics,
and compare them.
4.1.1 Decentralized scheduler
In our paradigm, we limit selection of workers to
1-hop from the outsourcer. This makes it possible,
and perhaps plausible, to incorporate scheduling of out-
sourcing tasks at the side of the outsourcer in a decen-
tralized manner—thus each node takes care of schedul-
ing its tasks. On the one hand, this could reduce the
complexity of the design by eliminating the schedul-
ing server in a centralized alternative. However, on the
other hand, this could increase the complexity of the
used protocols and the cost associated with them for
exchanging states—such as availability of resources, on-
line and offline time, among others. All of such states
are exchanged between workers and outsourcers in our
paradigm. These states are essential for building ba-
sic primitives in any distributed computing system to
improve efficiency (see below for further details). An
illustration of this design option is shown in Figure 1.
In this scenario, each outsourcer, as well as worker, has
its own separate scheduling component.
Worker 
Worker 
Worker 
Worker 
Worker 
Worker 
Worker 
Outsourcer 
Worker 
Scheduler Scheduler 
Figure 1: A depiction of the main Social-
Cloud paradigm as viewed by an outsourcer of
computations. The different nodes in the social
network act as workers for their friends, who act
as potential jobs/tasks outsourcers. The links
between social nodes are ideally governed by
a strong trust relationship, which is the main
source of trust for the constructed computing
overlay. Both job outsourcers and workers have
their own, and potentially different, schedulers.
4.1.2 Centralized Scheduler
Despite the fact that nodes may only require their
neighbors to perform the computational tasks on behalf
of them and that may require only local information—
which could be available to these nodes in advance, the
use of a centralized scheduler might be necessitated to
reduce communication overhead at the protocol level.
For example, in order to decide upon the best set of
nodes to which to outsource computations, a node needs
to know which of its neighbors are available, among
other statistics. For that purpose, and given that the
underlying communication network topology may not
necessarily have the same proximity of the social net-
work topology, the protocol among nodes needs to incur
back and forth communication cost.
One possible solution to the problem is to use a cen-
tralized server that maintains states of the different
nodes. Instead of communicating directly with neighbor
nodes, an outsourcer would request the best set of can-
didates among its neighbors to the centralized schedul-
ing server. In response, the server will produce a set
of candidates, based on the locally stored states. Such
candidates would typically be those that would have
the most available resources to handle the outsourced
computation task.
An illustration of this design option is shown in Fig-
ure 2. In this design, each node in SocialCloud would
periodically send states to a centralized server. When
needed, an outsourcer node contacts the centralized server
to return to it the best set of candidates for outsourcing
computations, which the server would return based on
the states of these candidates. Notice that only states
are returned to the outsourcer, upon which the out-
sourcer would send tasks to these nodes on its own—
Thus, the server involvement is limited to the control
protocol.
Worker 
Worker 
Worker 
Worker 
Worker 
Worker 
Worker 
Outsourcer 
Worker 
Scheduler 
Centralized 
Scheduler 
Figure 2: The decentralized model of task
scheduling in SocialCloud.
The communication overhead of this design option to
transfer states between a set of d nodes is 2d, where d
messages are required to deliver all nodes’ states and
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d messages are required to deliver states of all other
nodes to each node in the set. On the other hand,
d(d− 1) messages are required in the decentralized op-
tion (which requires pairwise communication of states
update). When outsourcing of computations is possible
among all nodes in the graph, this translates into O(n)
for the centralized versus O(n2) communication over-
head for the decentralized option. To sum up, Table 1
shows a comparison between both options.
Table 1: A comparison between the centralized
and decentralized scheduler options. Compared
features are resistance to failure, communication
overhead, required additional hardware, and re-
quired additional trust. F stands for failure, C
stands for communication, H stands for hard-
ware, and T stands for trust.
Option F C H T
Centralized ✖ O(n) ✖ ✖
Decentralized ✔ O(n2) ✔ ✔
4.2 Tasks Scheduling Policy
While the use of distributed or centralized scheduling
entity resolves the issue of scheduling at the outsourcer
side, two decisions remain unsolved: how much com-
putation to outsource to each node (worker), and how
much time a node among these workers should spend on
a given task for a certain outsourcer. We handle these
two issues separately.
As mentioned earlier, any off-the-shelf scheduling al-
gorithm can be utilized to decide the right scheduling
policy at the side of the outsourcer, which can be further
improved by incorporating trust characterization mod-
els for weighted job scheduling [38]. On the other hand,
for workers scheduling, we consider several scheduling
options as follows (notice that all of these policies are
applied with respect to “computing time”. This further
requires estimating the time required for each task as a
first step for using these policies).
• Round Robin (RR) Scheduling Policy. This
is the simplest policy to implement, in which a
worker spends an equal share of time on each out-
sourced task in a round robin fashion among all
tasks he has.
• Shortest First (SF) Scheduling Policy. The
worker performs shortest task first.
• Longest First (LF) Scheduling Policy. The
worker performs longest task first.
Notice that we omit a lot of details about the underlying
computing infrastructure, and abstract such infrastruc-
ture to “time sharing machines”, which further simpli-
fies much of the analysis in this work. In the results,
we experiment with the three scheduling policies.
4.3 Handling Outliers
The main performance criterion used for evaluating
SocialCloud is the time required to finish computing
tasks for all nodes with tasks in the system. Accord-
ingly, an outlier (also called a computing straggler) is
a node with computational tasks that take a long time
to finish, thus increasing the overall time to finish and
decreasing the performance of the overall system. De-
tecting outliers in our system is simple: since the total
time is given in advance, outliers are nodes with com-
puting tasks that have longer time to finish when other
nodes participating in the same outsourced computa-
tion are idle.
Our method for handling outliers is simple too: when
an outlier is detected, we outsource the remaining part
of computations on all idle nodes neighboring the orig-
inal outsourcer. For that, we use the same scheduling
policy used by the outsourcer when she first outsourced
this task. In the simulation part, we consider both sce-
narios of handled and unhandled outliers, and observe
how they affect the performance of the system.
4.4 Deciding Workers Based on Resources
In real-world deployment of a system like Social-
Cloud, we expect heterogeneity of resources, such as
bandwidth, storage, and computing power, in workers.
This heterogeneity would result in different results and
utilization statistics of a system like SocialCloud, de-
pending on which nodes are used for what tasks.
While our work does not address this issue, and leaves
it as a future work (c.f. §6.6 and §8). We further be-
lieve that simple decisions can be made in this regard
so as to meet the design goals and achieve the good
performance. For example, we expect that nodes would
select workers among their social neighbors that have
resources and link capacities exceeding a threshold, thus
meeting an expected performance.
5. SIMULATOR OF SocialCloud
To demonstrate the potential of SocialCloud as a
computing paradigm, we implement a batch-based sim-
ulator [40] that considers a variety of scheduling algo-
rithms, an outlier handling mechanism, job generation
handling, and failure simulation. A flow diagram of the
simulator is in Figure 3.
The flow of the simulator, which represents the flow
of the system, is depicted in Figure 3. First, the node
factory uses the bootstrapping social graph to create
nodes and their workers. Each node then decides on
whether she has a task or not, and if she has a task she
schedule the task according to her scheduling algorithm.
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If needed, each node then transfers code on which com-
putations are to be performed to the worker along with
the splits of the data for these codes to run on. Each
worker then performs the computation according to the
scheduling algorithm of the worker and returns the re-
sults of the computations to the outsourcer.
Timing. In SocialCloud, we use virtual time to
simulate computations and resources sharing. We scale
down the simulated time by 3 orders of magnitude of
that in reality. This is, for every second worth of com-
putations in real-world, we use one millisecond in the
simulation environment. Thus, units of times in the rest
of this paper are in virtual seconds.
Social  
Graph 
Node  
Factory 
Task  
Generator 
Nodes 
Task 
Scheduler 
Execute 
Tasks 
Scheduler 
For each node 
(with tasks)& Data and  
Code 
Transfer 
To 
Workers 
At every worker&
Return results&
Figure 3: The flow diagram of SocialCloud: so-
cial graph is used for bootstrapping the com-
puting service and recruit workers, nodes are
responsible for scheduling their tasks by deter-
mining the amount of work each of its neighbors
would process, and each worker (node) uses its
local scheduler to determine how much time is
allowed for each sub-task by its neighbors.
6. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In this section, in order to derive insight on the po-
tential of SocialCloud, we experiment with the sim-
ulator described above. Before getting into the details
of the experiments, we describe the data and evaluation
metric used in this section.
6.1 Evaluation Metric
To demonstrate the potential of operating Social-
Cloud, we use the “normalized finishing time” of a
task outsourced by a user to other nodes in the So-
cialCloud as the performance metric. We consider
the same metric over the different graphs used in the
simulation. To demonstrate the performance for the
population of all nodes that have tasks to be computed
in the system, we use the empirical CDF (commutative
distribution function) as an aggregate measure. For a
random variable X , the CDF is defined as FX(x) =
Pr(X ≤ x). In our experiments, the CDF measures the
fraction (or percent) of nodes that finish their tasks be-
fore a point in time x, as part of the overall number of
tasks. We define x as the factors of time of normal op-
eration per dedicated machines, if they were to be used
instead of outsourcing computations. This is, suppose
that the overall time of a task is Ttot and the time it
takes to compute the subtask by the slowest worker is
Tlast, then x for that node is defined as Tlast/Ttot.
6.2 Tasks Generation and Weights
Also for demonstrating the operation of our simula-
tor, and the trade-off that such operation provides, we
consider two different approaches for the tasks gener-
ated by each user. The size of each generated task is
measured by virtual units of time, and for our demon-
stration we use two different scenarios:
• Constant task weight. each outsourcer gen-
erates tasks with an equal size. These tasks are
divided into equal shares and distributed among
different workers in the computing system. The
size of each task is T¯ .
• Variable task weight. each outsourcer has a
different task size. We model the size of tasks as a
uniformly distributed random variable in the range
of [T¯ − ℓ, T¯ + ℓ] for some T¯ > ℓ. Each worker
receives an equal share of the task from the out-
sourcer.
6.3 Deciding Tasks Outsourcers
Not all nodes in the system are likely to have tasks to
outsource for computation at the same time. Accord-
ingly, we denote the fraction of nodes that have tasks
to compute by p, where 0 < p < 1. In our experiments
we use p from 0.1 to 0.5 with increments of 0.1. We fur-
ther consider that each node in the network has a task
to compute with probability p, and has no task with
probability 1 − p—thus, whether a node has a task to
distribute among its neighbors and compute or not fol-
lows a binomial distribution with a parameter p. Once
a node is determined to be among nodes with tasks at
the current round of run of the simulator, we fix the
task length. For tasks length, we use both scenarios
mentioned in §6.2; with fixed or constant and variable
tasks weights.
6.4 Social Graphs
To derive insight on the potential of SocialCloud,
we run our simulator on several social graphs with dif-
ferent size and density, as shown in Table 2. The graphs
used in these experiments represent three co-authorship
social structures (DBLP, Physics 1, and Physics 2), one
voting network (of Wiki-vote for wikipedia administra-
tors election), and one friendship network (of the con-
sumer review website, Epinion). All of these graphs
are made undirected, if they are not already, which ra-
tionalizes their use in our system. Notice the varying
density of these graphs, which also reflects on varying
topological characteristics. Also, notice the nature of
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these social graphs, where they are built in different so-
cial contexts and possess varying qualities of trust [38].
Next, we present the main results and findings of our
design when operated on these graphs.
Table 2: Social graphs used in our experiments.
Dataset # nodes # edges Description
DBLP 614981 1155148 CS Co-authorship
Epinion 75877 405739 Friendship network
Physics 2 11204 117649 Co-authorship
Wiki-vote 7066 100736 Voting network
Physics 1 4158 13428 Co-authorship
6.5 Main Results
In this section we demonstrate our paradigm and dis-
cuss the main results of this work. Due to the lack of
space, we delegate additional results to the technical re-
port in [39]. For all measurements, our metric of perfor-
mance and comparison is the normalized time to finish
metric, explained in section 6.1.
6.5.1 Performance When Varying the Number of Out-
sourcers
In the first experiment, we run our SocialCloud sim-
ulator on the different social graphs discussed earlier to
measure the evaluation metric when the number of the
outsourcers of tasks increases. We consider p = 0.1 to
0.5 with increments of 0.1 at each time. The results of
this experiment are in Figure 4. On the results of this
experiment we make several observations.
First, we observe the potential of SocialCloud, even
when the number of outsourcers of computations in the
social network is as high as 50% of the total number of
nodes, which translates into a small normalized time
to finish even in the worst performing social graphs
(about 60% of all nodes with tasks would finish in 2
normalized time units). However, this advantage varies
for different graphs: we observe that sparse graphs,
like co-authorship graphs, generally outperform other
graphs used in the experiments (by observing the ten-
dency in the performance in figures 4(a) through 4(c)
versus figures 4(d) and 4(e)). In the aforementioned
graphs, for example, we see that when 10% of nodes
in each case is used, and by fixing x, the normalized
time, to 1, the difference of performance is about 30%.
This difference of performance is observed between the
Physics co-authorship graphs—where 95% of nodes fin-
ish their computations—and the Epinion graph—where
only about 65% of nodes finish their computations.
Second, we observe that the impact of p, the fraction
of nodes with tasks in the system, would depend on the
graph rather than p alone. For example, in Figure 4(a),
we observe that moving from p = 0.1 to p = 0.5 (when
x = 1) leads to a decrease in the fraction of nodes that
finish their computations from 95% to about 75%. On
the other hand, for the same settings, this would lead
to a decrease from about 80% to 40%, a decrease from
about 65% to 30%, and a decrease from 70% to 30%
in DBLP, Epinion, and Wiki-vote, respectively. This
suggests that the decreases in the performance are due
to an inherit property of each graph. The inherit prop-
erty of each graph and how it affects the performance
of SocialCloud is further illustrated in Figure 5. In-
terestingly, we find that even if DBLP is almost two
orders of magnitude the size of Wiki-vote, for exam-
ple, it outperforms Wiki-vote when not using outlier
handling, and gives almost the same performance when
using outliers handling.
6.5.2 Performance with different scheduling policies
Now, we turn our attention to measuring and under-
standing the impact of the different scheduling policies
discussed in §4.2 on the performance of SocialCloud.
We consider the different datasets in Table 2, and use
p = 0.1 to 0.5 with 0.2 increments (the results are shown
in Figure 6). The observed consistent pattern in almost
all figures in this experiment tells that shortest first
policy always outperforms the round robin scheduling
policy, whereas the round robin scheduling policy out-
performs the longest first. This pattern is consistent
regardless of p and the outlier handling policy.
The difference in the performance when using differ-
ent policies can be as low as 2% (when p = 0.1 in physics
co-authorship; shown in Figure 8(b)) and as high as 70%
(when using p = 0.5 and outlier handling as in wiki-vote
(figure 6(o))). The patterns are made clearer in Figure 6
by observing combinations of parameters and policies.
We finally notice that, despite the difference in the
performance of SocialCloudwhen using different poli-
cies, it still result in reasonable normalized finishing
time to all users, suggesting its practicality against the
measured metric with different parameters.
6.5.3 Performance with Outliers Handling
Outliers, as defined in §4.3, drag the performance of
the entire system down. However, as pointed out ear-
lier, handling outliers is quite simple in SocialCloud if
accurate timing is used in the system. Here we con-
sider the impact of the outlier handling policy explained
in §4.3 on the aggregate performance for the entire sys-
tem. The impact of using the outlier handling policy
can be also seen on Figure 6, which is used for demon-
strating the impact of using different scheduling policies
as well. In this figure, we see that the simple handling
policy we proposed improves the performance of the
system greatly in all cases.
More specifically, the improvement in the performance
differs depending on other parameters, such as p, and
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Figure 4: The normalized time it takes to perform outsourced computations in SocialCloud. Differ-
ent graphs with different social characteristics have different performance results, where those with
well-defined social structures have self-load-balancing features, in general. These measurements are
taken with round-robin scheduling algorithm that uses the outlier handling policy in §4.3 for a fixed
task size (of 1000 simulation time units).
the scheduling policy. As with the scheduling policy,
the improvement can be as low as 2% and as high as
more than 60%. When p is large, the potential for im-
provement is high—see, for example, p = 5 in Physics
2 (in Figure 6) with the round robin scheduling policy
where almost 65% improvement is due to outlier han-
dling when x = 1.
6.5.4 Performance with Variable Task Size
In all of the above experiments, we considered com-
putational tasks of fixed size; 1000 of virtual time units
in each of them. Whether the same pattern would be
observed in tasks with variable size is unclear. Here we
experimentally address this concern by using variable
duty size that is uniformly distributed in the interval
of [500, 1500] time units. The results are shown in Fig-
ure 8. Comparing these results to the middle row of
Figure 6 (for the fixed size tasks), we make two obser-
vations. (i) While the average task size in both sce-
narios is same, we observe that the performance with
variable task size is worse. This performance is antic-
ipated as our measure of performance is the time to
finish that would be definitely increased as some tasks
with longer time to finish are added. (ii) The same pat-
terns advantaging a given scheduling policy on another
are maintained as in earlier with fixed task length.
6.5.5 Relationship Between Structure and Performance
It is worth noting that the performance of Social-
Cloud is quite related to the underlying structure of
the social graph. For example, sparse graphs such as co-
authorship graphs—which are pointed out in [38] to be
slow mixing graphs—are the graphs with performance
advantage in SocialCloud. These graphs, in particu-
lar, are shown to possess a nice trust value that can
be further utilized for SocialCloud. Furthermore,
this trust value is unlikely to be found in online so-
cial networks which are prone to infiltration, making
the case for trust-possessing graphs even stronger, as
they achieve performance guarantees as well. This, in-
deed, is an interesting finding by itself, since it shows
opposite outcomes to what is known in the literature on
the usefulness of these graphs—see §3 and more details,
see [38].
6.6 Additional Features and Limitations
Our simulator of SocialCloud omits a few details
concerning the way a distributed system behaves in re-
ality. In particular, our measurements do not report on
or experiment with failure. However, our simulator is
equipped with functionality for handling failure in the
same way used for handling outliers (c.f. §4.3). Further-
more, our simulator considers a simplistic scenario of
study by abstracting the hardware infrastructure, and
does not consider additional resources consumed, such
as memory and I/O resources. In the future, we will
consider equipping our simulator with such functional-
ities and see how this affects the behavior and benefits
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Figure 5: The performance of SocialCloud on the different social graphs used for our experiments,
demonstrating the inherent differences in the different social graphs. Both figures use p = 0.3 and the
round robin scheduling algorithm.
of SocialCloud.
One last concern related to our demonstration of our
paradigm is that we do not consider the heterogeneity
of resources, such as bandwidth and resources, in nodes
acting as workers in the system. Furthermore, we did
not consider how this affects the usability of our system
and what decision choices this particular aspect of dis-
tributed computing systems would have on the utility
of our paradigm. While this would be mainly a future
work to consider (c.f. §??), we expect that nodes would
select workers among their social neighbors that have
resources and link capacities exceeding a threshold, thus
meeting an expected performance outcome.
7. RELATED WORK
There have been many papers on the use of social
networks for building communication and security sys-
tems, studying the performance of such designs on top
of social networks, and analyzing the assumptions used
in these designs as well. Below we highlight a few ex-
amples of these efforts and works.
Systems built on top of social networks include file
sharing systems [30], anonymous communication sys-
tems [50, 42] Sybil defenses [18, 33, 56, 58], referral and
filtering systems [32, 44], and live streaming [35]. Most
of these applications weigh the trust in social graph,
and an algorithmic property that makes the operation
of these systems on top of social network effective. An-
other set of applications that exploit social networks’
trust is routing [7, 17, 20, 37]—in several settings, where
it has been shown that connectivity in social graphs can
be of benefit in disconnected networks. Finally, assump-
tions of social network-based systems are explored re-
cently, where Sybil defenses and their assumptions are
studied in [41], and trust is challenged in [38].
Perhaps the closest vein of related work in the liter-
ature to our work is on the use of social networks for
building computing services. Until the time of writing
this work, most of the prior research work has been
solely focused on providing storage services, but not
a platform of computations. Such storage services use
slightly different economical model from SocialCloud’s
model, where payment per Megabyte per month rates
are used as opposed to our eco-system. Examples of
such efforts are reported by Sato [45] and Tran et al. [48]).
Xu et al. [55] have further explored a first step in the
direction of building cloud computing platforms on top
of social networks where by considering the access con-
trol model in this domain with preferred access control
guarantees. The results of this work can be used as a
building block in our work to improve the quality of
access control and authorization.
With similar flavor of distributed computing services
design, there has been prior works in literature on us-
ing volunteers’ resources for computations exploiting
locality of data [14, 53], examination of programing
paradigms, like MapReduce [21] on such paradigm [34,
11]. Finally, our work shares several commonalities with
the grid and volunteer computing systems [36, 34, 14,
53, 2], of which many aspects are explored in the lit-
erature. Trust of grid computing and volunteer-based
systems is explored in [4, 5, 46, 31, 23]. Applications
built on top of these systems, that would fit to our use
model, are reported in [53, 11, 52], among others.
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Figure 6: The normalized time it takes to perform outsourced computations in SocialCloud for
different scheduling policies. Naming convention: U stands for unhandled outlier and B stands for
handled outliers (Balanced). RRS, SFS, and LFS stand for round-robin, shortest first, and longest
first scheduling. We fix the job size among all outsourcers.
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we have introduced the design of So-
cialCloud, a distributed computing service that re-
cruits computing workers from friends in social net-
works and use such social networks that characterize
trust relationships to bootstrap trust in the proposed
computing service. We further advocated the case of
such computing paradigm for the several advantages it
provides.
To demonstrate the potential of our proposed design,
we used several real-world social graphs to bootstrap
the proposed service and demonstrated that majority of
nodes in most cases would benefit computationally from
outsourcing their computations to such service. We con-
sidered several basic distributed system characteristics
and features, such as outlier handling, scheduling de-
cisions, and scheduler design, and show advantages in
each of these features and options when used in our
system.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first and only
work in literature that bases such design of computing
paradigm on volunteers recruited from social networks
and tries to bring the trust factor from these networks
and use it in such systems. This characteristic distances
our work from the prior work in literature that uses
volunteers’ resources for computations [14, 53].
Most important outcome of this study, along with the
proposed design, is the relationship exposed between
the social graphs and the behavior of the built comput-
ing service on top of them. In particular, we have shown
that social graphs that possess strong trust characteris-
tics as evidenced by face-to-face interaction [38], which
are known in the literature for their poor characteris-
tics prohibiting their use in applications (such as Sybil
defenses [18, 57, 58]), have a self-load-balancing charac-
teristics when the number of outsourcers are relatively
small (say 10 to 20 percent of the overall population
on nodes in the computing services). That is, the time
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Figure 7: The normalized time it takes to perform outsourced computations in SocialCloud for
different scheduling policies. Naming convention: U stands for unhandled outlier and B stands for
handled outliers (Balanced). RRS, SFS, and LFS stand for round-robin, shortest first, and longest
first scheduling. We sets jobs with variable lengths as described above.
it takes to finish tasks originated by a given fraction
of nodes in such graph, and for the majority of these
nodes, ends in a relatively short time.
On the other hand, such characteristics and advan-
tages are maintained even when the number of out-
sourcers of computations is as high as 50% of the nodes,
contrary to the case of other graphs with dense struc-
ture and high connectivity known to be proper for the
aforementioned applications. This last observation en-
courages us to investigate further scenarios of deploy-
ment of our design. We anticipate interesting find-
ings based on the inherit structure of such deployment
contexts—since such contexts may have different social
structures that would affect the utility of the built com-
puting overlay.
9. FUTURE WORK
In the future we will look at two directions. In the
first direction, we aim to complete the missing ingredi-
ent of the simulator and enrich it by further scenarios
of deployment of our design, under failure, with dif-
ferent scheduling algorithms at both sides of the out-
sourcer and workers (in addition to those discussed in
this work), and to consider other overhead characteris-
tics that might not be in line with topological character-
istics in the social graph. These characteristics may in-
clude the uptime, downtime, communication overhead,
and I/O overhead consumption, among others. One
interesting feature that we will consider is trust-based
scheduling, benefiting from the prior work in [38].
In the second direction, we will turn our attention
from the simulation settings to real-world deployment
settings, thus addressing options discussed in §6.6, and
to implement a proof-of-concept application, among those
discussed in §3.4, by utilizing design options discussed
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(b) Physics 2 (p = 0.3).
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(c) DBLP (p = 0.3).
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(d) Epinion (p = 0.3).
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
 0  0.5  1  1.5  2  2.5  3  3.5  4
C
D
F
Time (normalized)
BRRS
BLFS
BSFS
URRS
ULFS
USFS
(e) Wiki-vote (p = 0.3).
Figure 8: The normalized time it takes to perform outsourced computations in SocialCloud, for
variable task size.
in this paper. We anticipate a lot of hidden complex-
ities in the design to arise, and significant findings to
come out of the deployment that we will report on in
the future work.
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